The Duke
De la Rochefoucault
MAXIMS,

AND

MORAL REFLECTIONS.

BY THE

DUKE DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULT.

A NEW EDITION.

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PREFACE

TO THE EDITION OF 1749.

THE Public is here presented with a New Translation of the Modern Maxims of Francis the Sixth, Duke de la Rochefoucault: a performance of such estimation, that its nobler Author lived to see five or six Editions of it; and since his death it has run through as many more; not to mention Translations. As far as the two languages permit, the Translator has followed in the disposition of the Maxims the alphabetical order of M. Amelot de la Houssaye; to whom he is also beholden for many well-collected au-
authorities from the judicious Tacitus, and some other ancient writers. In his own notes he has chiefly aimed at the explanation, or illustration, of his Author's system. He has rejected such maxims as were manifest repetitions, or apparently spurious: and retained only such as, after comparison of the best Editions, he concluded to be genuine. He has also taken great care to express the sense of the Original (in which the English Translations have been hitherto defective); and at the same time (what none of them have attempted) to do the Duke de la Rochefoucault the justice to make him speak English.
ADVERTISEMENT
TO THE EDITION OF 1775.

THIS Edition of the Duke de la Rochefoucault's Maxims is not merely a republication of the last. The Translation has been revised, and treated with that sort of freedom which the former Editor seems to have taken with the edition that preceded. From this attention, and various additional Notes, the Edition now submitted to the Public may have obtained, it is hoped, some degree of advantage. But, after all,
to transfuse into our language the force and spirit of the original, both with conciseness and perspicuity, is rather to be attempted than executed.

High in esteem as these Maxims are held, it must be allowed that the ingenious writer stands criticised by many as too severe a Censor; giving ill constructions to indifferent actions, and ascribing even to good ones unworthy motives.

In favour of our Author's system it is alleged, that perfect virtue is not to be found in the present state of things; that a mixture of error and truth constitutes too many of
our actions; that he has considered the heart of man as corrupted by pride, seduced by self-love, encompassed by bad example; that certain human actions, which the world mistake for virtues, are really no more than their resemblances; that, in spite of the efforts of Reason, Pride and Self-love never fail to lurk in the recesses of the heart, and to diffuse their venom, for the most part, through its motions and inclinations.

M. de Voltaire has not scrupled to assert, that these Maxims contributed more than any other work to form the taste of the French nation, and give it a true relish for propriety
and correctness. "Though*," says he, "there is but one truth running through the whole piece, namely, that self-love is the spring of all our actions and determinations; yet this thought presents itself under such a variety of forms, as never fail to strike with new surprise. This little collection was much read and admired; it accustomed our authors to think, and to comprise their thoughts in a lively, correct, and delicate turn of phrase; which was a merit utterly unknown to any European writer before him, since the revival of letters. His Memoirs†

* Siècle de Louis XIV. † D'Anne d'Autriche.
"are still read, and his Maxims are known by heart."

In the Earl of Chesterfield’s Letters, lately published, we frequently view his Lordship both as an admirer and defender of our Author.

"La Rochefoucault is, I know, blamed," says his Lordship *, but "I think without reason, for deriving all our actions from the source of self-love. For my own part, I see a great deal of truth, and no harm at all, in that opinion. It is sufficient that we seek our own happiness in every thing we do; and it is as certain that we can only find it in doing well,

* Letter 129.
"and in conforming all our actions
to the rule of right reason, which
is the great law of Nature. It is
only a mistaken self-love that is a
blameable motive, when we take
the immediate and indiscriminate
gratification of a passion, or appe-
tite, for real happiness. But am I
blameable, if I do a good action
upon account of the happiness
which that honest consciousness
will give me? Surely not. On
the contrary, that pleasing con-
sciousness is a proof of my vir-
tue," &c. &c.—Again *, "Read
in the morning some of La Roche-
foucault's Maxims; consider them,
examine them well, and compare

* Letter 225.
them with the real characters you meet in the evening."—"Till you come to know mankind by your own experience*, I know no thing, nor no man, that can, in the mean time, bring you so well acquainted with them as Le Duc de la Rochefoucault. His little Book of Maxims, which I would advise you to look into, for some moments at least, every day of your life, is, I fear, too like and too exact a picture of Human Nature. I own, it seems to degrade it, but yet my experience does not convince me that it degrades it unjustly."

* Letter 273.
After such eminent testimonies to an established fame, the Reader will hardly expect any apology for offering to his perusal another edition of

THE

DUKE DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULT'S MAXIMS.

L. D.
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ABILITY.

THE desire of appearing to be wise, often prevents our becoming so.

2. Some persons of weak understanding are so sensible of that weakness, as to be able to make a good use of it.

3. The height of ability consists in a thorough knowledge of the real value of things, and of the genius of the age we live in.*

* Tacitus says of Seneca, "amœnum illi ingeniVM, & temporis illius auribus accommodatum." He had a pleasing genius, which was well adapted to the times he lived in.

Most of the authors immortalized by their con-
4. It requires no small degree of ability to know when to conceal it*.

5. Few of us have abilities to know all the ill we occasion.

6. There are some affairs, as well as distempers, which ill-timed remedies make worse; and great ability is

temporaries, have been indebted to this knowledge; or to the good fortune of living in times with which their abilities coincided. The Augustan age, fond of their new acquaintances the Greek writers, advanced to the pinnacle of fame all such Romans as imitated them tolerably well. Hence the undeserved reputation of some of the authors of that period. Among ourselves, the last age considered Poetry as comprehending all qualifications, even those of ambassadors and secretaries of state; the present, on the contrary, thinks it scarce worth reading.

* "Unus ex legatis (Helvetiorum) Claudius Cossus, notae facundiae; sed dicendi artem apta trepidatione occultans, atque eo validior, militis animum mitigavit." Tac. H. i. Claudius Cossus was a man of known eloquence; but he knew when to conceal it, and appeased a mutiny of the soldiery by feigning a panic.
requisite to know the danger of applying them *.

**ACCIDENTS.**

7. No accidents are so unlucky, but that the prudent may draw some advantage from them: nor are there any so lucky, but what the imprudent may turn to their prejudice.

8. Accidents sometimes happen from which a man cannot well extricate himself without a spice of madness.

* "Felix intempestivis remediis delicta accende-bat." Tac. A. xii. Felix increased disorders by unseasonable reformation.

"Omittere potius prævalida & adulta vitia, quam hoc adsequi, ut palam fieret quibus flagitiis impares essemus." Tac. A. iii. There are inveterate disorders, which it is more prudent to connive at, than to manifest our impotence by a vain attempt to suppress. "Nocuit (Galba) antiquus rigor & nimia severitas cui jam pares non sumus." Tac. H. i. Galba hurt himself by acting up to the severity of the ancient laws, which the times could not bear.
ACTIONS.

9. Great actions, the lustre of which dazzles us, are represented by politicians as the effects of deep design; whereas they are commonly the effects of caprice and passion. Thus the war between Augustus and Antony, supposed to be owing to their ambition to give a master to the world, arose probably from jealousy *

10. Men may boast of great actions; but they are oftener the effect of chance than of design.

11. Our actions are by some supposed to be under the influence of good or bad stars, to which they owe the praise or blame they meet with †.

* Pliny the Historian says, that the Social War had its rise from a private quarrel between Livius Drusus and Cæpio about a ring under sale, for which they bid against one another.

† A thousand superstitions of this sort were furnished by the religion of the Pagans, which served to raise their hopes as well as fears.
12. The most brilliant action ought not to pass for *great* when it is not the effect of great design.

13. A certain proportion should be observed between our designs and our actions, would we reap from both the advantages they might produce.

14. Our actions are like the terminations of verses, which we rhyme as we please *.

15. We should often be ashamed of our best actions, were the world witness to the motives which produce them.

16. To praise great actions with sincerity, may be said to be taking part in them.

* Actions, in themselves, are indifferent: the motives and the end are what characterize them.
ADVICE.

17. There is nothing of which we are so liberal as advice.

18. Nothing is less sincere than our manner of asking and of giving advice. He who asks advice would seem to have a respectful deference for the opinion of his friend; whilst yet he only aims at getting his own approved of, and making that friend responsible for his conduct. On the other hand, he who gives advice repays the confidence supposed to be placed in him by a seemingly disinterested zeal, whilst he seldom means more than his own interest or reputation *.

* Lord Shaftesbury, in his Soliloquy, says, "No one was ever the better for advice: in general, what we called giving advice was properly taking an occasion to shew our own wisdom at another's expence; and to receive advice was little better than tamely to afford another the occasion of raising himself a character from our defects."
19. There is near as much ability requisite to know how to profit by good advice, as to know how to act for one’s self.

20. We may give advice; but we cannot give conduct.

AFFECTATION.

21. We are never made so ridiculous by the qualities we have, as by those we affect to have.

22. We had better appear to be what we are, than affect to be what we are not.

AFFLICTION.

23. Whatever we may pretend, in terest and vanity are the usual sources of our afflictions.
24. There are in affliction several kinds of hypocrisy. Under the pretence of weeping for the loss of one who was dear to us, we weep for ourselves: we weep over the diminution of our fortune, of our pleasure, of our importance. Thus have the dead the honour of tears which stream only for the living. I call this a sort of hypocrisy, for we impose on ourselves. But there is another hypocrisy, which is less innocent, because it imposes on the world. This is the affliction of such as aspire to the glory of a great and immortal sorrow. When time, which consumes all things, has worn out the grief which they really had, they still persist in their tears, lamentations, and sighs. They assume a mournful behaviour; and labour, by all their actions, to demonstrate that their affliction will not in the least abate till death. This disagreeable, this troublesome vanity, is common among ambiti-
ous women. As the sex bars all the paths to glory, they endeavour to render themselves celebrated by the ostenta-
tion of an inconsolable affliction. There is yet another species of tears, whose shallow springs easily overflow, and as easily dry away. We weep, to acquire the reputation of being tender; we weep, in order to be pitied; we weep, that we may be wept over; we even weep to avoid the scandal of not weeping.

25. We lose some friends for whom we regret more than we grieve; and others from whom we grieve yet do not regret.

26. Most women lament the death of a lover, not so much out of real affection, as because they would appear to be the more worthy of having been beloved.
AGE.

27. Most people, as they approach old age, show in what manner both the body and the mind will decay*.

28. We arrive at the different ages of life mere novices; but want experience, though we have had many years to gain it †.

29. Vivacity, when it increases with age, is not far short of frenzy.

* To a skilful observer, the future defects of a man's mind and body may sometimes be visible from the time he is adult; as a good mechanic, from the accurate inspection of a machine, may perhaps predict where it will decay.

† Age does not necessarily confer experience: nor does even precept; nor any thing but an intercourse and acquaintance with things. And we frequently see those, who have wanted opportunities to indulge their juvenile passions in youth, go preposterous lengths in old age, with all the symptoms of youth except ability.
AGREEABLENESS.

30. We judge so superficially of things, that common words and actions, spoken and done in an agreeable manner, with some knowledge of what passes in the world, often succeed beyond the greatest ability*.

31. We may say of agreeableness, as distinct from beauty, that it is a symmetry whose rules are unknown; it is a secret conformity of the features to one another, to the complexion, to the carriage.

* "How often have I seen the most solid merit "and knowledge neglected, unwelcome, and even "rejected; while flimsy parts, little knowledge, and "less merit, introduced by the Graces, have been "received, cherished, and admired!"

_Ld. Chesterfield's 136th Letter._
32. The ambitious deceive themselves when they propose an end to their ambition; for that end, when attained, becomes a means.

33. When great men suffer themselves to be subdued by the length of misfortune, they discover that the strength of their ambition, not of their understanding, was that which supported them. They discover too, that heroes, allowing for a little vanity, are just like other men.

34. The greatest ambition entirely conceals itself, when what it aspires to is unattainable.

35. What seems to be generosity is often no more than disguised ambition; which overlooks a small interest, in order to gratify a great one.
36. Moderation must not claim the merit of combating and conquering ambition; for they can never exist in the same subject. Moderation is the languor and sloth of the soul; ambition its activity and ardour.

37. We pass often from love to ambition: but we seldom return from ambition to love.

APPLICATION.

38. Those who apply themselves too much to little things, commonly become incapable of great ones.

39. Few things are impracticable in themselves; and it is for want of application, rather than of means, that men fail of success.
AVARICE.

40. Misers mistake gold for their good; whereas it can, at best, be a mean of attaining it.*

41. Avarice is more opposite to economy than liberality.

42. Avarice in the extreme almost always makes mistakes. There is no passion that oftener misses its aim; nor

* That there is such an irrational avarice as confines itself to the mere satisfaction arising from heap- ing up, looking at, and touching gold and silver, without any regard to their use, every age furnishes us with too many examples to admit a doubt.

"Desire of riches is covetousness, a name used always in signification of blame: because men con- tending for them are displeased with one another attaining them; though the desire in itself be to be blamed or allowed, according to the means by which these riches are sought. Ambition, which is a desire of office or precedence, is a name used also in the worst sense for the reason before-men- tioned." Hobbes' Leviath.
on which the present has so much influence, in prejudice of the future.

43. Avarice often produces contrary effects. There are many people who sacrifice their fortunes to dubious and distant expectations; there are others who contemn great future for small present advantages.

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**BENEFITS.**

44. Men are apt not only to forget benefits and even injuries; but even to hate those who have obliged them, and to cease to hate those who have injured them. The very attention to requite kindnesses, and revenge wrongs, seems to be an insupportable slavery*

* "To have received greater benefits than there is hope to requite, disposeth to counterfeit love, but really to secret hatred; and puts a man into the estate of a desperate debtor, who, in declining
45. Every body takes pleasure in returning small obligations; many go so far as to acknowledge moderate ones: but there is hardly any one who does not repay great obligations with ingratitude.

CLEMENCY.

46. The clemency of princes is often policy to gain the affections of their subjects*.

47. Clemency, which we make a virtue of, proceeds sometimes from vanity, sometimes from indolence, often

"the sight of his creditor, tacitly wisheth him there where he might never see him more. For benefits oblige, and obligation is thraldom, and unrequitable obligations perpetual thraldom; which is hateful." Leviath. p. 48.

* "Novum imperium inchoantibus utilis clementiae fuma." Tac. A. iv. In the beginning of a reign, the reputation of clemency is serviceable.
from fear, and almost always from a mixture of all three.*

**CONSTANCY.**

48. The constancy of the wise is only the art of keeping disquietude to oneself.

49. The misfortunes of other people we all bear with an heroic constancy.

* Clemency proceeds sometimes from vanity; like that of Tiberius towards Silanus and Cominius. "Patientiam libertatis alienae ostentans." Tac. A. vi. Making an ostentation of his patience with regard to the liberties that were taken with him. Sometimes from indolence.] "Oblivione magis quam clementia." Tac. A. vi. Rather through forgetfulness than clemency. Often from fear.] "Julius Civilis periculo exemp-" tus, præpotens inter Batavos, ne supplicio ejus fe-" "rox gens alienaretur." Tac. H. i. Julius Civilis, who had great authority among the Batavi, was saved, for fear his punishment should irritate that warlike people.
50. Criminals at their execution affect sometimes a constancy, and contempt of death, which is, in fact, nothing more than the fear of facing it. Their constancy may be said to be to the mind what the cap is to their eyes.

51. Constancy in love is perpetual inconstancy: it attaches us successively to every one of the good qualities of the person beloved, giving sometimes the preference to one, sometimes to another. This kind of constancy therefore is no more than inconstancy confined to a single object.

52. In love there are two sorts of constancy: one arises from our continually finding in the favourite object fresh motives to love; the other from our making constancy a point of honour.

53. In misfortune we often mistake dejection for constancy: we bear it
without daring to look on it; like cowards, who suffer themselves to be murdered without resistance.

CONTEMPT.

54. We sometimes condemn the present by praising the past; we shew our contempt of what now is, by our esteem for what is no more *

55. None but the contemptible are apprehensive of contempt.

* We condemn the present by praising the past. This is the common track of satirists. "Credo pudicitiam Saturno rege moratam in terris." I believe there was such a thing on earth as chastity in Saturn's reign, says Juvenal. And this is no inconsiderable effort of poetical faith. To believe that things have always been as they are, seems reasonable enough: but to believe, because things are thus now, that they therefore were oppositely different formerly, approaches methinks to a Credo quia impossibile.
CONVERSATION.

56. Confidence in conversation has a greater share than wit.

57. The reason why we meet with so few men who are agreeable in conversation is, that there are scarce any who think not more of what they have to advance, than of what they have to answer. Even those who have the most address and politeness fancy they do enough if they only seem to be attentive; at the same time that their eyes and minds betray a distraction as to what is addressed to them, and an impatience to return to what they themselves were saying; not reflecting that to be thus studious of pleasing themselves is but a poor way of pleasing or convincing others; and that to hear patiently*, and answer precise-

* The greatest genius of the present age, speaking in conversation of a deceased friend, amongst
ly, are the great perfections of conversation*. 

**COQUETRY.**

58. It is a sort of coquetry to boast that we never coquet.

59. All women are coquets, though all do not practise coquetry. Some are restrained by fear, some by reason.

60. Women are not aware of the extent of their coquetry.

other qualities observed, "that he was a comfortable " hearer."

* "I must not omit one thing—which is atten-
"tion: an attention never to be wholly engrossed " by any past or future object, but instantly to be " directed to the present one, be it what it will. " An absent man can make but few observations— " he can pursue nothing steadily, because his ab-" sences make him lose his way. They are very " disagreeable and hardly to be tolerated in old " age; but in youth they cannot be forgiven."

*Lord Ch. 195th Let.*
61. Women find it more difficult to get the better of coquetry than love.

62. The greatest miracle of love is the reformation of a coquet.

63. We are always afraid of appearing before the person we love when we have been coquetting elsewhere*.

64. Coquets take a pride in appearing to be jealous of their lovers, in order to conceal their being envious of other women.

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CRIMES.

65. There are crimes which become innocent, and even glorious, through

* Coquets are those who studiously excite the passion of love; though they mean nothing less than to gratify it. The male coquets are nearly as numerous as the female.
their splendour, number, and excess: hence it is, that public theft is called address; and to seize unjustly on provinces is to make conquests *.

66. We easily forget crimes that are known only to ourselves †.

67. There are people of whom we never believe ill till we see it: but

* "Id in summa fortuna æquius quod validius; sua retinere privatae domus, de alienis certare regiam laudem." Tac. A. xv. Power is the justice of sovereigns: it is for private persons to preserve their own, but for princes to seize what belongs to others.

"Auferre, trucidare, rapere, falsis nominibus imperium; atque ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant." Tac. in Agric. To ravage, plunder, and murder, is to reign; to desolate a country is to pacify it.

† "Innocentem quisque se dicit respiciens testem, non conscientiam." Sen. Ep. III. Most people fancy themselves innocent of those crimes of which they cannot be convicted.

The English have a law-maxim, Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare. No man is legally compellable to accuse himself.
there are none at whom we ought to be surprised when we do see it.

68. Those who are themselves incapable of great crimes are ever backward to suspect others.

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**CUNNING.**

69. The greatest of all cunning is, to seem blind to the snares which we know to be laid for us. Men are never so easily deceived as while they are endeavouring to deceive others *

70. Those who have most cunning always affect to condemn it in others, that they may make use of it on some

* "Solum insidiarum remedium est, si non intelligantur." Tac. A. xiv. The best defence against a secret enemy is, to make him believe you are not aware of his snares.
great occasion, and to some great end.

71. The common practice of cunning is by no means a sign of genius; it frequently happens that those who use it to cover themselves in one place, lay themselves open in another.

72. Cunning and treachery proceed from want of capacity.

73. The sure way to be cheated is, to fancy ourselves more cunning than others.

74. We are angry with those who trick us, because they appear to have more cunning than ourselves.

75. One man may be more cunning than another, but not more so than all the world.
76. Those whom we deceive appear not near so ridiculous to us, as we do to ourselves when deceived by the cunning of others.

DEATH.

77. Few people are well-acquainted with death. It is generally submitted to through stupor and custom, not resolution: most men die merely because they cannot help it.

78. Death and the sun are not to be looked at steadily.

79. It may be proper to say something of that fallacy called a contempt of death. I mean that contempt which the heathens boasted to derive from their natural strength, unsupported by the hopes of a better life. There is a
wide difference between suffering death courageously, and contemning it: the one is common enough; the other I believe never to be sincere. Everything has been written that can persuade us that death is no evil; and some of the weakest as well as the greatest of men have given celebrated examples in confirmation of this tenet. Yet I doubt whether any person of good sense ever thought so. The pains we take to persuade ourselves and others of it plainly evince that it is no easy task. A man may, for many reasons, be disgusted with life; but he can have no reason for contemning death. Even suicides esteem it no slight matter, and are as much startled at it, and decline it as much as other people, when it comes in any other shape than that which they have chosen. The remarkable inequality in the courage of many valiant men
proceeds from death appearing differently to different imaginations, and seeming to be more instant at one time than another. By this means it happens, that, after having contemned what they did not know, they are at last afraid of what they do know. We must avoid considering death in all its circumstances, if we would not think it the greatest of all ills. The wisest and bravest are those who make the best pretences for not considering it at all: for every one that views it in its proper light will find it sufficiently terrible. The necessity of dying made the whole of philosophic fortitude. The philosophers thought it best to do that with a good grace which was not to be avoided; and, being unable to make themselves immortal, they did all they could to immortalize their reputations, and save what they might out of the general wreck. To be able to put a
good face on the matter, let us by no means discover even to ourselves all we think about it; let us trust rather to constitution, than to those vain reasonings which make us believe we can approach death with indifference. The glory of dying resolutely, the hopes of being regretted, the desire of leaving a fair reputation, the assurance of being delivered from the miseries of life, and being freed from the caprice of fortune, are all alleviating reflections, and not to be rejected: but we must by no means imagine them infallible. These serve indeed to give us courage, just as in war a poor hedge emboldens the soldier to approach an incessant firing. At a distance, they view it as a shelter; when they come up, they find it but a sorry defence. We flatter ourselves too much, in fancying that death, when near, will appear what we judged it to be when distant; and that our opinions, which
are weakness itself, will be firm enough not to give way on this severest of trials. We must be also ill-acquainted with the effects of self-love, to imagine that this will permit us to think lightly of an action which must necessarily be its destruction. Reason, from which we expect mighty assistance, is too feeble on this occasion, to make us believe even what we wish to find true. It is she, on the contrary, who betrays us; and, instead of inspiring a contempt of death, helps to discover its horrors. Indeed all she can do for us is to advise us to avert our eyes, and fix them on some other object. Cato and Brutus chose noble ones. A valet amused himself with dancing upon the scaffold on which he was going to be broken. Thus different motives sometimes produce the same effect. And so true it is, that whatever disproportion there may be between the great and the vulgar, we
often see them meet death with the like countenance: with this difference always, that the contempt of death affected by heroes is owing to their love of glory, which hides it from their sight. In common people it proceeds merely from a want of sensibility, which prevents their being aware of the greatness of the evil, and leaves them at liberty to think of something else*.

* The contempt of death has been accounted a virtue of the first class. Virgil makes it essential to the character of a happy man:

"Quique metus omnes, & inexorabile fatum, "Subjecit pedibus, strepituque Acherontis " avari."

He must be superior to every fear; even that of death, and its consequences.

The fear of death is peculiar to man; and may perhaps be a necessary instinct to counterbalance reason, which might else, too frequently, prompt him to quit his post; according to that noble thought of Lucan:
32

DECEIT.

30. To be deceived by our enemies, or betrayed by our friends, is insup-

"Victurosque Diī celant, ut vivere durent,
"Felix esse mori."

The Gods conceal from men the happiness of death, that they may endure life.

And though we find this instinct operating sufficiently in men, when under no immediate pressure, we may yet observe that it is surmountable by the exertion of every passion, even in the weakest and most timid people; of this the numberless examples we continually see will not admit a doubt. Nor are there wanting, among the few philosophic men who have been superior to instinct, instances of such as have given the irrefutable demonstration, the irreco-
cable fact, in confirmation of their rational fortitude, and sincere contempt of the bugbear death; which, without passion’s aid, they have encountered, with unaverted eyes, and undiverted attention. Nerva’s death is thus related by Tacitus: “Cocceius Nerva, “continuus principis, omnis divini humanique juris “sciens, integro statu, corpore illæso, moriendi con-
silium cepit. Quod ut Tiberio cognitum: adsi-
dere, causas requirere addere preces: fateri pos-
tremo grave conscientia, grave famæ suæ, si proxi-
mus amicorum, nullis moriendi rationibus, vitam
portable; yet are we often content to be served so by ourselves.

81. It is easy to deceive ourselves without perceiving it, as it is difficult to deceive others without being perceived.

82. A resolution never to deceive others, exposes a man to be deceived himself.

83. Dulness is sometimes a sufficient "fugeret. Aversatus sermonem Nerva, abstinen-" tiam cibi conjunxit." A. l. vi. Cocceius Nerva, a man well skilled in human and divine laws, in high favour, and in good health, came to a resolution to destroy himself. When the emperor was informed of it, he attended him, inquired into his reasons, intreated him to desist; and even confessed that it would lie on his conscience, and be pernicious to his fame, to have his best friend make away with himself, without the least apparent reason. But Nerva declined the conversation; and starved himself.
security against the attack of a deceitful man *.

84. He who imagines he can do without the world deceives himself much; but he who fancies the world cannot do without him is under a still greater deception.

85. In love, the deceit generally outstrips the distrust.

86. We are far happier when deceived by those we are in love with, than when undeceived †.

* "It is no easy thing to stick soft cheese on a hook." Diog. Laert.

† And we may cry out with Horace's madman:

"— Pol me occidistis, amici,
"Non servástis, ait; cui sic extorta voluptas,
"Et demptus per vim mentis GRATISSIMUS ERROR."
My friends, 'twere better you had stopp'd my breath;
Your love was rancour, and your cure was death.
To rob me thus of pleasure so refin'd,
The dear delusion of a raptur'd mind.
87. Should even our friends deceive us, though we have a right to be indifferent to their professions of friendship, we ought ever to retain a sensibility for them in misfortune.

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**DESIRE.**

88. It is much easier to suppress a first desire, than to satisfy those that follow.

89. Before we passionately desire any thing which another enjoys, we should examine into the happiness of its possessor.

90. We never desire ardently what we desire rationally.

91. Were we perfectly acquainted
with the object, we should never passionately desire it *

**DISGUISE.**

92. Were we to take as much pains to be what we ought to be, as we do to disguise what we really are, we might appear like ourselves, without being at the trouble of any disguise at all.

93. We are so used to disguise ourselves to others, that at last we become disguised even to ourselves.

94. Some disguised falsehoods are so like truths, that it would be judging ill not to be deceived by them.

* Sir Thomas More says, "the world is undone "by looking at things at a distance."
MAXIMS.

DISTRUST.

95. Our own distrust justifies the deceit of others *

96. That which commonly hinders us from shewing an openness of heart to our friends, is not so much a distrust of them as of ourselves.

97. How much soever we distrust the sincerity of others, we always believe them to be more ingenuous with ourselves than with any body else.

ELOQUENCE.

98. There is as much eloquence in the tone of voice, in the look, and in

* "Multi fallere docuerunt dum timent falli; & alii jus peccandi suspicando fecerunt." Senec. "p. iii. Many men provoke others to over-reach them by excessive suspicion; their extraordinary distrust in some sort justifying the deceit."
the gesture of an orator, as in the choice of his words*.

99. True eloquence consists in saying all that is proper, and nothing more.

**EMPLOYMENT.**

100. It is easier to appear worthy of the employments we are not possessed of, than of those we are.

* "The receipt to make a speaker, and an applauded one too, is short and easy. Take common sense quantum sufficit; add a little application to the rules and orders of the house, [of commons,] throw obvious thoughts in a new light, and make up the whole with a large quantity of purity, correctness, and elegancy of style. Take it for granted, that by far the greatest part of mankind neither analyse nor search to the bottom; they are incapable of penetrating deeper than the surface." *Id. Ch. Lett. 272.*

"The manner of your speaking is full as important as the matter, as more people have ears to be tickled than understandings to judge." *Id. Lett. 197.*
101. We appear great in an employment below our merit; but often little in one that is too high for us.*

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ENVY.

102. Those who imitate us we like much better than those who endeavour to equal us. Imitation is a sign of esteem, competition of envy †.

103. We often glory in the most criminal passion; but that of envy is

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* Tacitus says of Galba, that while he was a subject, he seemed above his condition; and, had he never attained the imperial dignity, every body would have judged him deserving of it. "Major privato visus, dum privatus fuit; & omnium consensu capax imperii, nisi imperasset." H. i.

† "Non ita certandi cupidus, quam propter amorem,
"Quod teimitari aveo." Lucret.

The chiefest glory of the Grecian state
I strictly trace, willing to imitate.
so shameful, that we dare not even own it.

104. Jealousy is, in some sort, rational and just; it aims at the preservation of a good which belongs, or which we think belongs, to us: whereas envy is a frenzy that cannot endure, even in idea, the good of others.

105. Our approbation of those who are just entering upon the world, is often owing to our secret envy of those who are well settled in it.

106. Pride, which excites, often helps us to moderate, envy.

107. Envy is more irreconcilable than hatred.

108. Envy is destroyed by true friendship, as coquetry is by true love.
109. Envy always outlives the felicity of its object.

110. More people are free from interested views, than from envy.

**FAULTS.**

111. We need not be much concerned about those faults which we have the courage to own.

112. We acknowledge our faults, in order to repair, by sincerity, the hurt they do us in the opinion of others.

113. We confess small faults, in order to insinuate that we have no great ones.

114. It is strength of mind sincerely to acknowledge our faults as well as our perfections: as it is weakness to
be insensible to what is good, as well as to what is bad in our composition.

115. Had we not faults of our own, we should take less pleasure in observing those of others.

116. We are often more agreeable through our faults, than through our good qualities.

117. The greatest faults are those of great men.

118. Dishonest men conceal their faults from themselves, as well as others: honest men know, and confess them.

119. There are some faults which, when well-managed, make a greater figure than virtue itself.
120. We are not bold enough to say in general, that we have no faults, and that our enemies have no good qualities; but in particular cases we seem to think so.

121. We have few faults that are not more excusable in themselves, than are the means which we use to conceal them.

122. We boast of faults that are the opposites to those we really have; thus, if we are irresolute, we glory in being thought obstinate.

123. We easily excuse in our friends those faults by which we ourselves are not affected.

124. We endeavour to get reputation by such faults as we determine not to amend.
125. It seems as if men thought they had not faults enow, for they increase their number by certain affected singularities; these are cultivated so carefully, that at last they become a sort of natural defects, beyond our power to reform.

FIDELITY.

126. The fidelity of most men is one of the arts of self-love, to procure confidence. It is the means to raise us above others, by making us the depositaries of their momentous concerns.

127. It is more difficult to be faithful to a mistress when on good terms with her, than when on bad.
FLATTERY.

128. We should have but little pleasure, were we never to flatter ourselves.

129. Did we not flatter ourselves, the flattery of others could never hurt us *.

130. Flattery is a sort of bad money, to which our vanity gives currency.

131. Men sometimes think they hate flattery, whilst they hate only the manner of it.

* "Adulatione servilia fingebant, securi de frigilitate credentis." Tac. A. xvi. People flatter us, because they can depend on our credulity.
FOLLY.

132. Folly closely attends us through life. When a man seems to be wise, it is merely that his follies are proportionate to his age and fortune.

133. He who lives without folly is not so wise as he imagines.

134. It is great folly to affect to be wise by one's self.

135. Some follies are like contagious distempers.

136. There are certain people fated to be fools; they not only commit follies by choice, but are even constrained to do so by fortune.
137. Whatever difference may appear in men's fortunes, there is nevertheless a certain compensation of good and ill, that makes all equal *.

138. Fortune turns every thing to the advantage of her favourites †.

139. The happiness and misery of men depend no less on temper than fortune ‡.


† "Multos qui conflictari videantur beatos; ac ple-rosque quamquam magnas per opes miserrimos." Tac. A. vi. Many who seem wretched are happy; and many are miserable in the midst of riches.

‡ "Through certain humours, or passions, and from temper merely, a man may be completely
140. Fortune breaks us of many faults which reason cannot *

141. The generality of people judge of us by our reputation or our fortune †.

142. To be great, we must know how to push our fortune to the utmost.

143. Fortune exhibits our virtues and vices, as the light shews objects ‡.

" miserable, let his outward circumstances be ever so fortunate." Ld. Shaftesb. vol. ii. p. 84.

* Pauperes necessitas, divites satietas, in melius mutat. Necessity reforms the poor, and satiety the rich.

† " Studia militum in Cæcinnam inclinabant, " vigore ætatis, proceritate corporis, & quodam " inane favore." Tac. H. ii. The soldiers were well-affected to Cæcinna, because he was in his prime, tall and majestic, and much in vogue.

‡ " Ambigua de Vespasiano fama; solusque om- " nium ante se principum in melius mutatus est." Tac. H. i. Vespasian's reputation was ambiguous,
144. Fortune is ever deemed blind by those on whom she bestows no favours.

145. To be able to answer for what we shall certainly do, we must be able to answer for fortune.

146. We should manage our fortune like our constitution; enjoy it when good, have patience when bad, and never apply violent remedies but in cases of necessity.

147. Fortune and caprice govern the world.

and he was the first emperor who altered for the better.

"Primus Antonius nequaquam pari innocentia post Cremonam (excisam) agebat; satisfactum bello ratus, seu felicitas in tali ingenio avaritiam, superbiam cæteraque occulta mala patescit." Tac. H. iii. Anthony, after his destruction of Cremona, behaved no longer with discretion and moderation; he considered the war as ended; or perhaps that prosperity would disclose his avarice, ambition, and other concealed vices.
FRIENDSHIP.

148. What is commonly called friendship is no more than a partnership; a reciprocal regard for one another's interests, and an exchange of good offices: in a word, a mere traffic wherein self-love always proposes to be a gainer.

149. Though most of the friendships of the world ill deserve the name of friendship, yet a man may make use of them occasionally, as of a traffic whose returns are uncertain, and in which it is usual to be cheated.

150. In the distress of our best friends we always find something that does not displease us. *

* This maxim gave occasion to Dr. Swift's celebrated Verses on his own Death. The introductory
151. The reason why we are so changeable in our friendship is, that it is as difficult to know the qualities of the heart, as it is easy to know those of the head.

152. We love every thing on our own account: we even follow our own taste and inclination when we prefer our friends to ourselves; and yet it is this preference alone that lines give the Dean's opinion of our author, and a poetical version of the maxim.

As Rochefoucault his maxims drew 
From nature, I believe them true:  
They argue no corrupted mind  
In him: the fault is in mankind.  

This maxim, more than all the rest,  
Is thought too base for human breast:  
"In all distresses of our friends,  
"We first consult our private ends;  
"While nature, kindly bent to ease us,  
"Points out some circumstance to please us."

See also Ld. Chesterfield's defence of this maxim.  
Lett. 129.
constitutes true and perfect friendship.

153. It is more dishonourable to distrust a friend, than to be deceived by him.

154. We often imagine that we love men in power; but it is all interest at bottom: we espouse not their party to do them any service, but to make them of service to ourselves*.

155. We sometimes lightly complain of our friends, to be beforehand in justifying our own levity.

156. We are often very much afflicted for our friends, when their mis-

* "Fatebor & fuisse me Sejano amicum, & ut essem expetisse.—Ut quisque Sejano intimus, ita ad Cæsaris amicitiam validus." Tac. A. v.—I own, I was Sejanus's friend; for there was no other road to favour.
fortunes give us an opportunity of signalizing our affection for them.

157. We are fond of exaggerating the love our friends bear us; but it is less from a principle of gratitude, than from a desire of prejudicing people in favour of our own merit.

158. We love those who admire us, but not those whom we admire.

159. Rare as true love is, it is less so than true friendship.

160. The reason why few women give into friendship is, that to those who have experienced love*, friendship is insipid.

161. In friendship, as in love, we are often happier in our ignorance than our knowledge.

* Wine is ever insipid to dram-drinkers.
162. It is equally difficult to have a friendship for those whom we do not esteem, as for those whom we esteem more than we do ourselves.

163. The greatest effort of friendship is, not the discovery of our faults to our friend, but an endeavour to convince him of his own.

164. The charm of novelty, and that of long habit, opposite as they are, equally conceal from us the faults of our friends.

165. The generality of friends put us out of conceit with friendship; just as the generality of religious people put us out of conceit with religion.

166. Renewed friendships require a nicer conduct than those that have never been broken.
GALLANTRY.

167. There are many women who never have had one intrigue; but there are few who have had only one.

168. We seldom talk of a woman's first intrigue before she has had a second.

169. Love is the smallest part of gallantry.

170. The gallantry of the mind consists in an agreeable flattery.

GLORY.

171. The glory of great men is ever to be rated according to the means used to acquire it.
172. We exalt the reputation of some, in order to depress that of others; we should not extol so much the prince of Condé and marshal Turenne, were we not inclined to blame both.

173. It is as commendable to be proud with respect to one's self, as it is ridiculous to be so with respect to others.

174. We are unwilling to lose our lives, and yet would fain acquire glory. Hence it is, that the brave use more dexterity to avoid death, than men versed in the chicanery of law do to preserve their estates.

* "Populus neminem sine æmulo sinit." Tac. A. xiv. The public gives to every great man a rival.

† Above all things, says Pythagoras, reverence yourself.
GOODNESS.

175. Nothing is more rare than true goodness: those who imagine they possess it have little more than either complaisance or weakness.

176. It is very difficult to distinguish diffusive general goodness from great address.

177. None deserve the character of being good, who have not spirit enough to be bad: goodness, for the most part, is either indolence, or impotence *.

* "Seginis, pavidus, & socordia innocens." Tac. H. i. Lazy, timorous, good through stupidity.

Caprice is sometimes a source of goodness;

"And made a widow happy for a whim." Pope.
178. A fool has not stuff enough about him to make a good man.

179. The resolute alone can be truly good-natured; those who commonly seem to be so are weak, and easily soured.

GRAVITY.

180. Gravity is a mysterious carriage of the body, invented to cover the defects of the mind.*

* "The duke de la Rochefoucault's definition of gravity," says Sterne, "deserves to be written in letters of gold. Gravity is an errant scoundrel, and of the most dangerous kind too, because a sly one; and more honest well-meaning people are bubbled out of their goods and money by it in one twelvemonth, than by pocket-picking and shop-lifting in seven. The very essence of gravity is design, and consequently deceit; a taught trick
GRATITUDE.

181. Gratitude, like honesty among traders, helps to carry on business: in trade we pay, not because we ought, but in order to find easier credit another time.

182. Not all those who discharge their debts of gratitude should flatter themselves that they are grateful.

183. The reason for misreckoning in expected returns of gratitude is, that the pride of the giver and receiver can never agree about the value of the obligation.

"to gain credit of the world for more sense and knowledge than a man is worth."
Shandy, v. i. ch. xi.

"Gravity is of the very essence of imposture."
Shaftesb. Charact, v. i. p. 11.
184. There is a certain warmth of gratitude, which not only acquits us of favours received, but even, while we are repaying what we owe, converts our creditors into debtors*.

185. The gratitude of most men is only a secret desire to receive greater favours.

HAPPINESS.

186. No person is either so happy or so unhappy as he imagines.

187. We are less anxious to become happy, than to appear so.

* "A grateful mind
" By owing, owes not; but still pays: at once
" Indebted and discharged."

Paradise Lost.
188. Happiness lies in imagination, not in possession: we are made happy by obtaining, not what others think desirable *, but what we ourselves think so.

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**HEART.**

189. Every man speaks well of his heart, but no one dares to speak well of his head.

190. A man is sometimes well acquainted with his head, when he is not so with his heart.

* Horace thus speaks of luxurious eating:

"Non in caro nidore voluptas
"Summa, sed in te ipso est; tu pulmentaria
"quære
"Sudando."  

*Lib. II. Sat.* ii.

"In you consists the pleasure of the treat:
"Not in the price or flavour of the meat."
191. The head is ever the dupe of the heart.*

* “Plusieurs diroient en periode quarré, que
" quelques reflexions que fasse l'esprit, & quelques
" resolutions qu'il prenne pour corriger ses travers,
" le premier sentiment du cœur renverse tous ses
" projets. Mais il n'appartient qu'a M. de la Roche-
" foucault de dire tout en un mot, que l'esprit est
" toujours la dupe du cœur.” Many could have
said in a round period, that whatever reflections the
mind may make, and whatever resolutions it may
take to reform its irregularities, the first motion of
the heart overturns all its projects. But the duke
de la Rochefoucault alone can say all this in—“ the
“ head is ever the dupe of the heart.” Bouhours,
L'Art de Penser.

Ld. Chesterfield (Letter 112th) quotes Rochefou-
cault thus; “L'esprit est souvent la dupé du cœur.
" If he had said, instead of souvent, presque toujours,
" I fear he would have been nearer the truth.” But
his lordship, perhaps, quoted from memory; for in
the copies we have consulted toujours is the word.—
Cœur and esprit imply so many senses, and heart
and mind so few, that the thought, in our language,
so translated, would have been flat. By the heart,
however, is to be understood the seat of the passions,
by the mind the seat of reason. Our author fre-
quently uses the expression.—“ Cœur and esprit,”
says a French writer, “ are fashionable words; we
192. The head cannot long act the part of the heart.

193. Imagination cannot invent so many contrarieties as naturally possess the heart of man.

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HEROES.

194. Nature sometimes gives great advantages; but the concurrence of fortune must be obtained to make heroes.

195. There are heroes in bad, as well as in good actions*.

"hear of nothing else; we have a book called, A "Quarrel between the Mind and the Heart (De- "mele, du Cœur et de l'Esprit." )

* Tacitus of Petronius: "Ut alios industria, ita "hunc ignavia, protulerat ad famam: habebatur- "que non ganeo et profligator, sed erudito luxu."
HONOUR.

196. A single honour acquired is surety for more.

HUMOUR.

197. Our own caprice is yet more extravagant than the caprice of fortune.

198. It is fancy that fixes the value on the gifts of fortune.

199. Our humour is apt to be more in fault than our understanding.

A. xvi. Others acquire fame by industry; he got it by effeminacy; yet he was not accounted a debauchee or spendthrift, but a man of taste in pleasure.
200. We may say of the temper of men as of most buildings, that it has several aspects; of which some are agreeable, some disagreeable.

201. The humours of the body have a regular stated course, and insensibly influence the will; they circulate, and successively exercise a secret power over us. In short, they have a considerable share in all our actions, though we perceive it not.

202. Madmen and fools see every thing through the medium of humour *.

203. The calm or disquiet of our humour depends not so much on affairs of moment, as on the disposition of the trifles that daily occur.

* The jaundiced eye sees every thing yellow.
204. It is a mistake to imagine, that only the violent passions, such as ambition and love can triumph over the rest. Idleness, languid as she is, often masters them all; she indeed influences all our designs and actions, and insensibly consumes and destroys both passions and virtues.

205. Idleness, timidity, and shame, often keep us within the bounds of duty; whilst virtue seems to run away with all the honour of it *.

206. Idleness belongs more to the mind than to the body.

* “Metus temporum obtentui, ut quod Segnitia erat Sapientia vocaretur.” Tac. H. i. Timidity sometimes passes for wisdom. “Gnarus sub Neron temporum quibus inertia pro sapientia fuit.” Under Nero it was wisdom to be inactive.
JEALOUSY.

207. Under some circumstances it may not be disagreeable to have a jealous wife; for she will always be talking of what pleases her husband.

208. Those only who avoid giving jealousy are the persons who are deserving of it.

209. Jealousy is always born with love, but does not always die with it.

210. Jealousy is nourished by doubt; and either becomes madness, or ceases as soon as we arrive at certainty.

211. In Jealousy there is less of love than of self-love *.

* Witness Rhadamistus, who threw his beloved wife into a river, that she might not fall into the hands of another.—Also Love and Madness (Case of Hackman and Miss Reay), p. 297.
212. There is a species of love whose excess prevents jealousy.

213. Jealousy, though the greatest of evils, is the least pitied by those who occasion it.

ILLS.

214. Philosophy easily triumphs over past and future ills; but present ills triumph over philosophy.

215. The good we have received from a man should make us bear with the ill he does us.

216. It is less dangerous to do ill *

* "Beneficia eo usque læta sunt, dum videntur exsolvi posse; ubi multum antevenere, pro gratia odium redditur." Tac. A. iv. When benefits are such as can never be repaid, the benefactor is usually hated instead of thanked.
to most men, than to do them much good.

217. A readiness to believe ill without examination, is the effect of pride and laziness. We are willing to find people guilty, and unwilling to be at the trouble of examining into the accusation.

218. Weakness often gets the better of those ills which reason could not.

INCONSTANCY.

219. There is an inconstancy proceeding from the levity or weakness of the mind, which makes it give into every one's opinions: and there is another inconstancy, more excusable, which arises from satiety.
INGRATITUDE.

220. An extraordinary haste to discharge an obligation is a sort of ingratitude.

221. There are some ungrateful people who are less to be blamed for their ingratitude than their benefactors.

222. You seldom find people ungrateful so long as you are in a condition to serve them.

223. It is no great misfortune to oblige ungrateful people, but an insupportable one to be under an obligation to a scoundrel.

224. We like better to see those on whom we confer benefits, than those from whom we receive them.
INTEREST.

225. Interest speaks all languages, and acts all parts, even that of disinterestedness itself.

226. Interest blinds some people, and enlightens others.

227. To interest, the name of virtue is as serviceable as vice.

228. The virtues and vices are all put in motion by interest.

229. Good-nature, that boaster of sensibility, how often is it stifled by the smallest interest?

230. Through interest alone we condemn vice, and extol virtue.
231. In small interests we venture to disbelieve appearances.

**LOVE.**

232. No disguise can long conceal love where it is, nor feign it where it is not.

233. Since it is not more in our power to love than to let it alone, a lover has no right to complain of his mistress's inconstancy, nor she of her lover's levity.

234. It is difficult to define love*: we may say of it, however, that in the

* This is surely but a dark confused account of love; and hardly will any one cry out after having read it, *Nunc scio quid sit amor.* Mr. Hobbes has thus defined it, in much fewer words. "It is the love of one singularity, with desire to be singularly beloved. And the same, with fear that the love is not mutual, is jealousy."
soul it is a desire to reign, in minds it is a sympathy, and in bodies a secret inclination to enjoy what we love after many difficulties.

235. To judge of love by most of its effects, one would think it more like hatred than kindness*.

236. There are few people who are not ashamed of their amours when the fit is over.

237. Love is one and the same in the original; but there are a thousand different copies of it.

* "Quod petiere premunt arcte, faciuntque do-
" lorem
" Corporis, & dentes illidunt sæpe labellis."
Lucret. 1. iv.

What they desired, they hurt; and 'midst the bliss
Raise pain; when often with a furious kiss
They wound the balmy lip. Crecech.
238. Love, like fire, cannot subsist without continual motion; as soon as it ceases to hope or fear, it ceases to exist.

239. Love lends his name to many a correspondence wherein he is no more concerned than the Doge is in what is done at Venice.

240. The more you love your mistress, the readier you are to hate her.

241. To love *, is the least fault of

* "Viros ad unum quodque maleficium singulæ cupiditates impellunt; mulieres autem ad omnia "maleficia cupiditas una ducit." Cic. 1. iv. de Art. Rhet. Single vices make men commit single crimes; but one vice makes women guilty of all.—The reason is, that general contempt and ill-usage which custom has made the consequences of the forfeiture of female virtue. For women, finding themselves irrecoverably undone by a single slip, and treated as if nothing could be added to their guilt, stop afterwards at no single crime, because they know that they are thought capable of all.
the woman who has abandoned herself to love.

242. There are people who would never have been in love, had they never heard talk of it.

243. The pleasure of loving is to love; we are much happier in the passion we feel, than in that we excite.

244. To fall in love, is much easier than to get rid of it.

245. Novelty is to love like bloom to fruit; it gives a lustre, which is easily effaced, but never returns.

246. It is impossible to love a second time those whom we have really ceased to love.

247. We forgive, just as long as we love.
248. In love, we often doubt of what we most believe.

249. The man who thinks he loves his mistress for her sake is much mistaken.

250. Young women who would not be thought coquetts, and old men who would not be ridiculous, should never speak of love as of a thing that in any wise concerns them.

251. Nothing is more natural or more fallacious than to persuade ourselves that we are beloved.

252. In love, those who are first cured are best cured.

253. All the passions make us commit faults; but in love we are guilty of the most ridiculous ones.
254. In the old age of love, as in that of life, we continue to live to pain, though we cease to live to pleasure.

255. There are many cures for love; but not one of them infallible.

256. Love, all-agreeable as it is, pleases more by the manner in which it shews itself, than on its own account.

257. Women in love more easily forgive great indiscretions than small indelicacies.

258. A lover never sees the faults of his mistress till the enchantment is over.

259. We are much nearer loving those who hate us, than those who love us more than we like.
260. A man of sense may love like a madman, but never like a fool *. 

261. The reason why lovers are never weary of each other is this, they are always talking of themselves.

262. Love and prudence are inconsistent; proportionally as the former increases, the latter decreases †.

* Gay tells us, however, that, "In love we are all fools alike." Experience, perhaps, justifies his opinion.

† According to Ovid, love and dignity also are inconsistent:

Non bene convenient, nec in una sede morantur, Majestas & Amor.
263. To study men, is more necessary than to study books*.

264. Men and things have their particular point of view: to judge of some, we should see them near; of others we judge best at a distance.

265. The truly honest man is he who sets no value on himself.

* "The proper study of mankind is man," says Mr. Pope.—"Learning," says Ld. Chesterfield, "is acquired by reading books; but the more necessary learning, the knowledge of the world, is only to be acquired by reading men, and studying all the various editions of them." Again, "All are in general, and yet no two in particular, exactly alike. Those who have not accurately studied, perpetually mistake: they do not discern the shades and gradations that distinguish characters seemingly alike, &c. &c." "Let the great book of the world be your principal study." Lett. 217 and 243.
266. He must be truly honest who is willing to be always open to the inspection of honest men.

**MARRIAGE.**

267. There may be convenient marriages, but there are no delightful ones.

**MERIT.**

268. Those who think themselves persons of merit, take a pride often in being unlucky: they make themselves, as well as others, believe that they are worthy to be the butt of fortune.
269. To undeceive a person prejudiced in favour of his own merit, is to do him the same bad office that was done to the madman at Athens, who fancied all the vessels which came into the port to be his own.*

270. It is a sign of extraordinary

* This noble Athenian, when recovered from his indisposition, declared that he never had more pleasure than whilst he was distempered, which he remembered well; adding, that his friends would have obliged him much, to have let him enjoy a happiness that put him in possession of all things, without depriving any body of the least. Ælian tells this story of Thrasyllus.

"Qui feroit-il, helas, si quelque audacieux
"Alloit pour son malheur lui desiller les yeux?
"Qu’il maudiroit le jour ou son ame insensee
"Perdit l’heureuse erreur qui charmoit sa pensee."  Boileau, Sat. iv.

Should some officious person open his eyes, he would curse the day on which he was deprived of the delightful illusion. See Maxim 86.
merit, when the envious are forced to praise *.

271. Nature gives merit, and good fortune sets it to work.

272. Some people with great merit are very disgusting; others with great faults are very pleasing †.

273. There are those whose merit consists in saying and doing foolish things seasonably. An alteration of conduct would spoil all ‡.

* "Ne militibus quidem ingrata fuit Celsi salus, " eandem virtutem admirantibus cui irascebantur." The soldiery, who were angry with Celsus, yet wished him well on account of his merit. Tac. H. i.

† "Quædam virtutes odio sunt; severitas obsti- " nata, invictus adversum gratiam animus." Tac. A. xv. There are odious virtues; such as inflexible severity, and an integrity that accepts of no favour.

‡ Those, perhaps, who with great faults are very pleasing; mentioned in the former maxim.
274. The art of setting off moderate qualifications steals esteem; and often gives more reputation than real merit.

275. It is merit that procures us the esteem of men of sense; but our good fortune procures us that of the public.

276. Merit in appearance is oftener rewarded than merit itself.

277. Merit, like fruit, has its season.

"Poppæus Sabinus, modicus originis, consulatum ac triumphale decus adeptus, maximisque provinciis per viginti quatuor annos impositus, nullam ob eximiam artem, sed quod par negotiis neque supra erat." Tac. A. vi. Poppæus Sabinus, of moderate birth, obtained the consulship, and the honour of a triumph; and governed during twenty-four years the greatest provinces, without any extraordinary merit; being just capable of his employments, and in no manner above them.
278. We should not judge of a man's merit by his great qualities, but by the use he makes of them.

279. Censorious as the world is, it is oftener favourable to false merit than unjust to true.

**MODERATION.**

280. The moderation of happy people is owing only to the calm that good-fortune bestows upon the temper *.

* "Tantum honorum atque opum in me cumulasti, ut nihil felicitati meae desit, nisi moderatio ejus. Caetera invidiam augent." Tac. A. xiv. You have so loaded me with honours and riches, that nothing can be wanting to my prosperity but moderation. Any thing more will excite envy.
281. Moderation is a dread of incurring that envy and contempt which attend upon intoxicated prosperity: it is an ostentation of the strength of the mind. Moderation in an exalted station is the desire of appearing superior to fortune.

282. We make a virtue of moderation, in order to bound the ambition of great men; also to comfort moderate geniuses for their slender fortune, and their slender merit.

283. Moderation resembles temperance. We are not so unwilling to eat more, as afraid of doing ourselves harm by it.
284. Old age is a tyrant, which forbids the pleasures of youth on pain of death.

285. Few people are qualified to be old.

286. As we grow old we grow foolish as well as wise.

287. Old-age gives good advice *

* Terence makes a young fellow speak thus of his old father:

"Perii! is mihi, ubi adhibit plus paulo, sua quae narrat facinora!
Nunc ait, periculum ex aliis facito tibi, quod ex usu flet:
Astutus!"

Speaking of another, Shews how he'd act in such a case himself: Yet when he takes a sup or two too much, Oh, what mad pranks he tells me of his own!

Colman.
when it is no longer able to give bad example.

288. Old fools are more foolish than young ones.

OPPORTUNITY.

289. Opportunities make us known to ourselves as well as to others.

290. In affairs of importance, we ought less to contrive opportunities, than to use them when they offer.

291. Our qualities, both good and bad, are uncertain and dubious; and at the mercy of opportunity.
PASSIONS.

292. The duration of our passions is as little in our power as the duration of our lives.

293. The passions are the only orators that always succeed. They are, as it were, nature’s art of eloquence, fraught with infallible rules. Simplicity, with the aid of the passions, persuades more than the utmost eloquence without it.

294. In the heart of man there is a perpetual succession of the passions; so that the destruction of one is almost always the production of another.

295. Passions often beget their opposites: avarice produces prodigality, and prodigality avarice; men are often
constant through weakness, and bold through fear.

296. When we subdue our passions, it is rather owing to their weakness than to our own strength.

297. So much injustice and self-interest enter into the composition of the passions, that it is dangerous to obey their dictates; we ought to be on our guard against them even when they seem most reasonable.

298. Notwithstanding all the care we take to conceal our passions under the pretences of religion and honour, they still appear through such flimsy veils.

299. Absence destroys small passions, and increases great ones: the wind extinguishes tapers, but kindles fires.
300. We are by no means aware of the influence of our passions.

301. The heart, while it is still agitated by the remains of one passion, is more susceptible of another, than when entirely at rest.

302. Those who, during life, are under the influence of strong passions, are happy; and miserable when cured of them*.

* Those who would eradicate all hopes and fears out of the human breast, as the means of happiness, are but ill-acquainted with the economy of the mind. The inaction and apathy that are the necessary attendants on such a state would be greater evils than the most unbounded licence of the passions.
PENETRATION.

303. The great defect of penetration is not so much in falling short of, as in going beyond, the mark *.

304. Penetration has an air of divination; it pleases our vanity more than any other quality of the mind.

PHILOSOPHERS.

305. The contempt of riches in the philosophers was a concealed desire of revenging on fortune the injustice done to their merit, by despising the good which she had denied them. It was

* ———— It is my nature's plague
To spy into abuses; and oft my jealousy
Shapes faults that are not. Othello.
a secret shelter from the ignominy of poverty; a bye-way to arrive at the esteem which they could not procure by wealth.

306. The fondness or indifference for life in the old philosophers, was a taste of their self-love; which ought no more to be controverted than the taste of the palate, or the choice of colours.

* According to Aristippus’s repartee to Diogenes:

"Si pranderet olus patienter, regibus uti
"Nollet Aristippus. Si sciret regibus uti,
"Fastidiret olus qui me notat."

_Horat. Ep. xvii._

His patient herbs could Aristippus eat,
He had disdain’d the tables of the great;
And he who censures me, the sage replies,
If he could live with kings, would herbs despise.
PIETY.

307. The piety of old women is often a decent way of escaping the disgrace and ridicule attendant on decayed beauty; it is an endeavour to continue upon a respectable footing.*

PITY.

308. Pity is a sense of our own misfortunes in those of another man: it is a sort of foresight of the disasters that may befall ourselves. We assist others, in order that they may assist us on like occasions; so that the services we of-

* It is also an employment for them. Mr. Pope has assigned them another:

"See how the world its veterans rewards;

"A youth of conquests, an old-age of cards."
fer to the unfortunate are in reality so many anticipated kindnesses to ourselves *.

PRIDE.

309. Pride always indemnifies itself, and takes care to be no loser, even when it renounces vanity.

310. If we were not proud ourselves,

* "Grief for the calamity of another is pity; and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himself; and therefore is called also compassion, and, in the phrase of this present time, a fellow-feeling: and therefore for calamity arriving from great wickedness the best men have the least pity; and for the same calamity, those hate pity that think themselves least obnoxious to the same." Hobbes' Leviath. The celebrated sentence of Terence, "Homo sum, humani nihil alienum a me puto," is indeed the same opinion, more concisely expressed—I am a man, and feel for all mankind.
we should not complain of the pride of others.

311. Pride is equal in all men; it differs only in the means and manner of shewing itself.

312. Nature, which has so wisely adapted the organs of our bodies to our happiness, seems with the same view to have given us pride, in order to spare us the pain of knowing our imperfections*.

318. In our remonstrances to persons guilty of faults, pride is more concerned than benevolence; for we reprove, not so much with a design to correct, as to make them believe that we ourselves are free from such failings.

* "And pride bestow'd on all, a common friend." Pope.
314. Pride would never owe, nor self-love ever pay.

315. Our pride is often increased by what we retrench from our other faults.

316. The same pride that make us condemn the faults we are exempt from, inclines us to despise those good qualities which we are not possessed of.

317. In our concern for the misfortunes of our enemies there is often more pride than goodness of heart. By shewing our compassion we make them feel our superiority.

318. Nothing flatters our pride more than the confidence of the great, because we esteem it the effect of our merit; not reflecting that it proceeds
most frequently from their own inability to keep a secret. So that confidence is sometimes a relief to the mind, by throwing off the oppressive load of secrecy*.

319. Pride has its caprices, as well as other passions: we are ashamed to own that we are jealous, yet value ourselves for having been so, and for being susceptible of it.

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**PRAISE.**

320. The shame that arises from praise undeserved, often makes us do

* The difficulty of keeping a secret has been satirized in the story of Midas's barber. Midas had taken care to hide, under a Phrygian bonnet, the deformity of asses ears. His barber discovered the secret: not daring to speak out, he imparted it to the earth; whence sprung reeds which divulged it.
things we should never otherwise have attempted.

321. We seldom heartily praise those who do not admire us.

322. When we blame ourselves we mean no more than to extort praise.

323. We are not fond of praising without having a view to self-interest. Praise is an artful, concealed, refined flattery; which pleases (but with an essential difference) the giver and receiver: the one takes it as the reward of merit, the other gives it to shew his candor and discernment.

324. Envenomed praise exposes, by a side-blow, in the person we commend, such faults as we durst not any other way lay open. *

* "Pessimum inimicorum genus laudantes." Tac.

Panegyrista are the most dangerous enemies.
325. We seldom praise but with a view to be praised.

326. Few are wise enough to prefer useful reproof to treacherous praise *

327. Resistance to praise is a desire to be praised twice.

328. There are reproaches which praise, and there are praises which re- proach †.

* " Pertissimis, si consulerentur, vera dicturis: " arcuere eos intimi amicorum Vitellii; ita formatis " principis auribus, ut aspera quæ utilia, nec quid- " quam nisi jucundum & læsurum acciperet." Tac. H. iii. Vitellius might have known the truth from the old officers, but his courtiers kept them off; having accustomed him not to hear any thing disagreeable, though useful; but to listen to every thing pleasing and pernicious.

† Pliny relates to Cæsar, that his blame was so artful as to seem praise. " Ita reprehendit, ut " laudet." Lib. iii. ep. xii. " Augustus cum Ti- " berio tribunitiam potestatem a patribus postu- " laret, quamquam honorisica oratione, quædam de " cultu & institutis ejus jecerat, quæ velut excu-
329. That modesty which seems to decline praise, is the desire of being praised with more delicacy.*

330. An ambition to merit praise fortifies our virtue. Praise bestowed on wit, valour, and beauty, always contributes to their augmentation†.

"sando exprobraret." Tac. A. i. When Augustus demanded the tribunitial power of the senate for Tiberius: in an oration made in his praise, he dropped something about his temper and disposition that seemed to accuse while he was excusing him.

* But Cæsar never will your Horace hear,
A languid panegyric hurts his ear.
Too strongly guarded from the poet's lays,
He spurns the flatterer and his saucy praise.
Francis, 1. II. s. i.

† The senate, says Tacitus, loaded Nero with praises, to excite the young emperor from the glory acquired by little actions to greater. "Magnis pa-
"trum laudibus; ut juvenilis animus, levium quo-
"que rerum gloria sublatus,majores continuaret."
"Sinistra erga eminentes interpretatio; nec minus
"periculum ex magna fama, quam ex mala." The world is apt to judge unfavourably of eminent merit. A great reputation is as dangerous as a bad one.
331. Our bad actions expose us less to persecution and hatred than our good qualities.

332. It is not enough to possess great qualities; we must also have the management of them*.

333. Some good qualities, when natural, degenerate into faults; others,

* "Brutidium artibus honestis copiosum, & si rectum iter pergeret ad clarissima quæque iturum, festinatio extimulabat; dum æquales, dein supe- riores, anteire parat: quos multos etiam bonos pessumdedit; qui, spretis quæ tarda cum securi- tate, præmatura vel cum exitio properant." Tac. A. iii. Brutidius was possessed of good qualities sufficient to have raised him to the highest dignities, had he not through precipitation quitted the usual track; labouring to outstrip first his equals, then his superiors: a rock on which many worthy men have split: while they strove at the greatest hazard to obtain prematurely what with a little patience they would have had with perfect safety.
when acquired, are always imperfect. For example, reason must teach us to be frugal of our fortune and our confidence; nature must give us benevolence and valour.

334. It is with some good qualities as with good parts; they are incomprehensible and inconceivable to such as are deprived of them.

335. To live without envy is a certain indication of great qualities.

336. Bad qualities sometimes constitute great talents.

**REASON.**

337. We want strength sufficient to act up to our reason.
338. A man is not deemed rational because chance may throw reason in his way; he alone is rational who knows, distinguishes, tastes it.

339. We except against a judge in affairs of small moment, but are content that our reputation and glory should be dependent on the decision of men who oppose us, through jealousy, prejudice, or want of discernment: yet it is merely to engage these to determine in our favour that we often hazard our ease and lives.

340. Whatever be the ignominy we may have incurred, we have it generally in our power to re-establish our reputation.

* Particularly by a generous death: as Tacitus says of Sempronius: "Constantia mortis haud in-
341. Self-love is more artful than the most artful of men.

342. Common education instils into young people a second self.

343. Self-love is the greatest of flatterers.

344. The first impulse of joy we feel from the good-fortune of a friend proceeds neither from our good-nature

"dignus Sempronii nomine, vita degeneraverat." 
A. i. Though he had degenerated from his great ancestors by a disorderly life, he rendered himself worthy of them by his constancy in death.

"Descendam magnorum haud unquam indignus avorum." 

Virg.

Receive a soul unsullied yet with shame, 
Which not belies my great forefathers name.
nor friendship; it is the effect of self-
love, which flatters us either with the
hope of being happy in our turn, or of
making some advantage of his prospe-

345. Self-love, as it happens to be
well or ill conducted, constitutes virtue
and vice.

346. Human prudence rightly un-
derstood is circumspect enlightened
self-love.

347. We are so often prepossessed in
our own favour, that we often mistake
for virtues* those vices that bear some
resemblance to them, and which are
artfully disguised by self-love.

* "Species virtutibus similes." Tac. A. xv.
Seeming virtues.
"Ipsa vitia pro virtutibus interpretamur." Tac. A. i.
We mistake vices for virtues.
348. Notwithstanding all the discoveries that have been made in the regions of self-love, there still remains much *terra incognita*.

349. Self-love magnifies, or diminishes, the good qualities of our friends, in proportion to the satisfaction we take in them; and we judge of their merit by the terms they keep with us.

350. Nothing is so capable of diminishing self-love, as the observation, that we disapprove at one time what we approve at another.

351. Self-love never reigns so absolutely as in the passion of love: we are always ready to sacrifice the peace of those we adore, rather than lose the least part of our own.

352. The self-love of some people is such, that when in love, they are more
taken up with the passion, than the object of it.

353. Self-love is the love of self, and of every thing for the sake of self. When fortune gives the means, self-love makes men idolize themselves, and tyrannize over others *. It never rests or

* Self-love is the spring of all animal action. Nature has implanted it in animals with a twofold view; the good of the individual, and that of the species: and operates on them by a twofold impulse; an insupportable uneasiness attendant on its suppression, and a pleasurable sensation annexed to its gratification. In brutes, this motive to action being under the sole direction of instinct, is in general uniform and evident. In man, instinct has been superadded to reason, and self-love becomes complex and mysterious. It is plain, from fact, that all animals are in some degree social; some of them (if we may so speak) living under monarchical, some oligarchical, others democratical, and the rest patriarchal government. The stifling, or exerting, the principle that thus unites them, has always its concomitant pain or pleasure. And instinct, where she is sole governess, impels them invariably and unerringly to nature's end and their own good; which are always united,
fixes anywhere from home. If it settle on external things, it is only as the bee

though not always absolutely the same. For example, animals eat to appease their hunger, or please their palate; they have no more view to sustenance, than the sexes, in their intercourse, have to propagation. Men, too, so far as they act under instinct, act unerringly; when that leaves them, they have recourse to reason; which not being at all times, nor in all persons, equally right and strong, does not always prompt to what is equally true and just. Society is undoubtedly the interest of all mankind; and though an universal government has never yet been, nor most probably ever will be formed, yet the wants of every man make him confederate with, and join himself to, some particular public. Now, as in order to the establishment of a state it is indispensably necessary to supersede some private rights, which are indeed compensated reflectively, though in a less obvious manner, this seems to produce cases wherein the good of the government and that of the subject clash. And certainly there are occasionally instances where the necessities of the commonwealth bear so hard on particular members as would give them a distaste to society, did not the uniting principle, the love of the species, the affection for the community of which they are a part, lighten the oppression, sooth the grievance, and, by benevolent reflection, even render it pleasureable. To actions deduced
doth on flowers, to extract what may be serviceable. Nothing is so impetu-
ous as its desires, nothing so secret as its designs, nothing so artful as its con-
duct. Its suppleness is inexpressible; its metamorphoses surpass those of Ovid, and its refinements those of che-
mistry. We can neither fathom the

from this source, the self-love of the rest of the com-

munity (which reaps the benefit of these seeming self-sacrifices) ascribes extraordinary merit, annexes attendant glory, and calls them virtuous: which vir-
tue, relatively to the kind, though it be highly meri-
torious, is yet not disinterested, because repaid by the reflex pleasure of the actor: and may also be carried so far as to become irrational and vicious; for "to " be virtuous," says Lord Shaftesbury, "is to have " one's affections right in respect of one's self as well " as of society." So that virtue is found to be, not a disinterested benevolence toward the species, but of that sort which is its own reward; not a boundless enthusiasm for the public, but the social affection conducted by reason. It is rational humanity; or, according to our author, well-regulated self-love. And thus,

"True self-love and social are the same."

Pope.
depth, nor penetrate the obscurity of its abyss. There, concealed from the most piercing eye, it makes numberless turnings and windings: there, it is often invisible even to itself: there, it conceives, breeds, and cherishes, without being sensible of it, an infinity of different inclinations; some of which are so monstrous, that it either knows them not when brought forth, or cannot prevail on itself to own them. From the gross darkness that envelopes it, springs the ridiculous notion entertained of itself; thence its errors, ignorance, and silly mistakes. Thence it imagines those sensations dead which are but asleep, sits down quietly when only taking breath for a new chase; and thinks that it has lost all appetite, because for the present it is rather sated. But the thick mist which hides it from itself, hinders it not from seeing perfectly whatever is without; and thus resembles the eye, that sees all things except
itself. In great concerns, and important affairs, where the violence of desire summoneth the whole attention, it sees, perceives, understands, invents, suspects, penetrates, and divines all things;—one would be tempted to believe that each passion had its respective magic. No cement is so close and strong as its attachments; which in vain it attempts to break or dissolve even upon impending misery. Yet sometimes, what could not be accomplished with the cruelest efforts for years, are effected without trouble. Whence we conclude, that by itself are its desires inflamed, rather than by the beauty and merit of the objects; that its own taste heightens and embellishes them; that itself is the game it pursues; and its own inclination, what is followed rather than the things which seem to be the objects of inclination. Composed of contrarieties, it is imperious and obedient, sincere and hypocritical, merciful and cruel, timid.
and bold. Its inclinations, according to the different tempers that possess and devote it—sometimes to glory, sometimes to wealth, sometimes to pleasure. These are changed as age and experience alter: and whether it has many inclinations, or only one, is a matter of indifference; because it can split itself into many, or collect itself into one, just as is convenient or agreeable. It is inconstant; and numberless are the changes, besides those that happen from external causes, which proceed from self.—Inconstant through levity, through love, through novelty, through satiety, through disgust, through inconstancy itself.—Capricious; and sometimes labouring with eagerness and incredible pains to obtain things that are no ways advantageous, nay, even hurtful, but which are pursued merely as a present affection.—Whimsical, and often exerting intense application, in employments the
most insipid, and preserving all its haughtiness in the most contemptible. —Attendant on all ages and conditions; living every where; living on every thing; living on nothing.—Easy either in the enjoyment, or privation, of things; going over to those who are at variance with it; even entering into their schemes; and, wonderful! joining with them, hates itself; conspires its own destruction; labours to be undone; desires only to exist; and, that granted, consents to be its own enemy. We are not therefore to be surprized if sometimes closing with the most rigid austerity, it enters boldly into a combination against itself; because what is lost in one respect is regained in another. When we think it relinquishes pleasures, it only suspends, or changes them; and even when discomfited, and we seem to be rid of it, we find it triumphant in its own defeat.—Such is self-love! of which man’s life is only a
strong, a continued agitation. The sea is its representative; in the flux and reflux of whose waves self-love may find a lively expression of the turbulent succession of its thoughts, and of its eternal motion.

THE SOUL.

354. The health of the soul is as precarious as that of the body; for when we seem the most secure from passions, we are no less in danger of their infection than we are of falling ill, when we appear to be in good health.

355. There are relapses in the dis-tempers of the soul, as well as in those of the body; thus we often mistake
for a cure what is no more than an intermission, or a change of disease*.

356. The flaws of the soul resemble the wounds of the body: the scar always appears, and there is a danger of its breaking out again.

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**TALKATIVENESS.**

357. We speak very little when vanity prompts us not.

358. The excessive pleasure we feel in talking of ourselves, ought to make us apprehensive that we afford little to our auditors.

* "Dilatae voluptates, dissimulata luxuria, falsæ virtutes, & vitia reditura." Tac. H. i. Suspended pleasures, and disguised passions, are false virtues, or vices that will certainly return.
359. We acknowledge that we should not talk of our wives; but we seem not to know that we should talk still less of ourselves.

360. We had rather talk ill of ourselves than not talk at all.

361. It is never more difficult to talk well than when we are ashamed of our silence.

TASTE.

362. It is as common for men to change their taste, as it is uncommon for them to change their inclination.

363. A good taste is the effect of judgment more than of the understanding.
364. We give up our interest sooner than our taste.

365. Our taste declines with our merit.

366. Our self-love bears with less patience the condemnation of our taste than of our opinion.

TRUTH.

367. Truth is not so beneficial as its appearances are prejudicial to us.

368. Our enemies, in their judgment of us, come nearer to truth than we do to ourselves.
VALOUR.

369. The love of glory, the fear of shame, the design of making a fortune, the desire of rendering life easy and agreeable, and the humour of pulling down other people, are often the causes of that valour so celebrated among men.

370. Valour in private soldiers is a hazardous trade, taken up in order to get a livelihood.

371. Perfect valour, and perfect cowardice, are extremes which men seldom experience. The intermediate space is prodigious, and contains all the different species of courage, which are as various as mens' faces and humours. There are those who expose themselves boldly at the beginning of an action;
but slacken and are disheartened at its duration. There are others who do little more than aim at preserving their honour. Some men are not equally exempt from fear at all times alike. Some fall occasionally into a general panic. Some advance to the charge because they dare not stay in their posts. There are men whom small dangers inspire, and fit them for greater. Some are brave at the sword, but fearful of bullets: others defy bullets, but dread a sword. All these different kinds of valour agree in this, that night, as it augments fear, so it conceals good or bad actions, and gives every one the opportunity of sparing himself. There is also another more general discretion: for we find that those who do most, would do more still, were they sure of coming off safe: so that it is very plain that the fear of death gives a damp to courage.
372. Perfect valour consists in doing without a witness all that we should be capable of doing before the whole world *.

373. In war, most men sufficiently expose themselves to save their honour, but few so much as is necessary even to succeed in the design for which they thus expose themselves.

374. No man can answer for his courage if he has never been in danger.

375. A wise man had rather avoid an engagement than embrace a conquest.

* Valour is the contempt of death and pain. "Pleraque cepta initiis valida, spatio languescunt." Tac. A. iii. Most enterprizes that are brisk at first, languish towards the conclusion. "Obscurum noc-" tis obtentus fugientibus." Tac. H. ii. The darkness of the night is a protection to runaways. "Major vitae quam gloriae cupido." Tac. A. iv. We love life more than glory.
376. It is our own vanity that makes the vanity of others intolerable *.

377. Though vanity really overturn not the virtues, it certainly makes them totter.

378. The most violent passions have their intermissions: vanity alone gives us no respite.

379. The reason why the pangs of shame and jealousy are sharp is this—Vanity affords no assistance in supporting them.

* "Adeo familiare est hominibus, omnia sibi ignoscere, nihil aliis remitteret." Paterc. I. ii. We overlook all faults in ourselves, but none in others.
380. Vanity induces us, more than reason, to act against inclination.

VICE.

381. When our vices leave us, we flatter ourselves that we have left them *.

382. Vices enter into the composition of virtues, as poisons into the composition of medicines. Prudence mixes and tempers, and makes good use of the compound against the ills of life.

383. The reason we are not often wholly possessed by a single vice, is, that we are distracted by several.

* The vices wait for us through life, like hosts with whom we are obliged successively to lodge; and it is uncertain, were we twice to take the same journey, whether experience would make us avoid them.
VIOLENCE.

384. The violence done us by others is often less painful than that which we do to ourselves.

385. The violence we do to ourselves, in order to prevent love, is often more rigorous than the cruelty of a mistress.

VIRTUE.

386. Our virtues are commonly disguised vices.

387. What we mistake for virtue is often no more than a concurrence of
divers actions and interests, which fortune, or industry, disposes to advantage. It is not always from the principle of valour and chastity that men are valiant, or that women are chaste.

388. Prosperity is a stronger trial of virtue than adversity.

389. The virtues are lost in self-interest, as rivers are in the sea.

390. To the honour of virtue it must be acknowledged, that the greatest misfortunes befall men from their vices.

391. We despise not all those who have vices; yet we despise all those who have no virtues.

392. Nature seems to have prescribed to every man at his birth the bounds both of his virtues and vices.
393. Virtue would not go far, if vanity did not bear her company *

394. Men dare not, bad as they are, appear to be open enemies to virtue: when therefore virtue is persecuted, it is represented as counterfeit, or some crime is laid to its charge.

UNDERSTANDING.

395. Strength and weakness of mind are improper terms, they are in reality only the good or ill disposition of the organs of the body.

* "Tolle ambitionem & fastuosos spiritus, nullus hebebis nec Platones, nec Catones, nec Scaevolas, nec Scipiones, nec Fabricios." Seneca.

Take away ambition and vanity, and where will be your heroes or patriots.
396. It is a common fault to be never satisfied with our fortune, nor dissatisfied with our understanding.

397. Politeness of mind consists in a courteous and delicate conception.

398. It often happens that things present themselves to our minds more finished, than we could, with much labour, make them.

399. The defects of the mind, like those of the face, grow worse as we grow old.

400. The understanding is better employed in bearing the misfortunes that actually befall us, than in penetrating into those that possibly may.

401. It is not so much through a fertility of invention that we occasion-
ally find expedients; as through a poverty of judgment, which makes us listen to every thing that imagination presents, and hinders us from discerning what is best.

402. A man of sense finds much less difficulty in submitting to one who is wrong-headed than in attempting to set him right.

403. The labours of the body free us from the pains of the mind. This it is that constitutes the happiness of the poor*.

* "It is certain that as in the body, when no labour or natural exercise is used, the spirits, which want their due employment, turn against the constitution, and find work for themselves in a destructive way; so in a soul, or mind, unexercised, and which languishes for want of action and employment, the thoughts and affections, being obstructed in their due course, and deprived of their natural energy, raise disquiet, and foment a rancorous eagerness and tormenting irritation. The temper from hence becomes more
404. The mind, between idleness and constancy, fixes on what is easy and agreeable. This habit always sets bounds to our enquiries: no man was ever at the trouble to stretch his genius as far as it would go.

405. Small geniuses are hurt by small events: great geniuses see through and despise them.

UNTRUTH.

406. An aversion to untruth is often no more than an imperceptible ambition to make our testimony considerable, and to give our words a religious weight.

"impotent in passion, more incapable of real moderation, and, like prepared fuel, readily takes fire by the least spark."

WEAKNESS.

407. Weakness is the only fault that is incorrigible*.

408. Weakness is more opposite to virtue than is vice itself.

409. Men are oftener treacherous through weakness than design.

410. Weak people are incapable of sincerity.

* It is however the fault of Nature, for which a man is just as blameable as a vessel is for being faulty, i.e. defective.

Lord Chesterfield says, Men are more unwilling to have their weaknesses and imperfections known than their crimes: and that if you hint to a man that you think him ignorant, silly, or even ill-bred or awkward, he will hate you more and longer than if you tell him plainly you think him a rogue. Lett. 129.
411. More men are guilty of treason through weakness than any studied design to betray.

412. If there be a man whose weak side has never been discovered, it is only because we have never accurately looked for it *.

413. Silence is the happiest course a man can take who is diffident of himself.

* Lord Chesterfield seems to have had this maxim full in view when he wrote his 97th Letter. He tells us, that every body has a prevailing weakness; that Cardinal Richelieu, the ablest of statesmen, had the idle vanity to be thought the best poet too; that Sir Robert Walpole's prevailing weakness was to be thought to have a polite and happy turn to gallantry, of which he had undoubtedly less than any man living; and those who had any penetration applied to it with success.
WEARINESS.

414. We boast that we are never out of spirits; and yet are too much conceited to own that we are never bad company.

415. We easily forgive those who weary us, but can never forgive those who are wearied by us.

416. We are almost always wearied with the company of those very persons with whom we ought never to be wearied.

WISDOM.

417. Man's chief wisdom consists in being sensible of his follies *.  

* —— "Sapientia prima (est)  
" Stultitia caruisse."—— Horat.  
Ev'n in our flights from vice some virtue lies,  
And, free from folly, we to wisdom rise.
418. Our wisdom is no less at Fortune’s mercy than our wealth.*

419. It is easier to be wise for others than for ourselves †.

420. Wisdom is to the mind what health is to the body ‡.


† — "Ita quæsò (dii vostram fidem!)
" Itane comparatam esse hominum naturam omnium,
" Aliena ut melius videant & dijudicent
" Quam sua! An eo sit, quia in re nostra aut gaudio
" Sumus praepediti nimia, aut ægritudine?"

Gods! that the nature of mankind is such, To see and judge of the affairs of others Much better than their own! Is't therefore so, Because that in our own concerns we feel The influence of joy and grief too nearly? Ter.

‡ — "Mens sana in corpore sano." Juv.
Forgive the Gods the rest, and stand confin’d To health of body and content of mind.
WIT.

421. Confidence in conversation has a greater share than wit.

422. No fools are so troublesome as those who have some wit.

423. Those who have but one sort of wit are sure not to please long.

424. Wit sometimes tempts us to play the fool with great courage*.

425. As it is the characteristic of great wits to say much in few words, so small wits seem to have the gift

* It is by vivacity and wit that a man shines in company; but trite jokes and loud laughter reduce him to a bufloon. Chesterf. Lett. 134.
of speaking much and saying nothing*.

426. Those are mistaken who imagine wit and judgment to be two distinct things. Judgment is only the perfection of wit, which penetrates into the recesses of things, observes all that merits observation, and perceives what seems imperceptible. We must therefore agree, that it is extensive wit which produces all the effects attributed to judgment†.

* (Ceux) “qui parlent beaucoup, ne disent ja-
“ mais rien.” Boileau, Ep. ix. People who talk much say nothing. Or, as Terence expresses it:

“Næ ista hercle magno jam conatu magnas
“nugas dixerit.” Heautontim.

— “She’ll take mighty pains
“ To be delivered of some mighty trifle.”

Colman.

† This is a more rational account of wit and judgment than that of those antithesis philosophers who make diametrical opposites of two mental operations, which, if not strictly the same, are at least inseparably united; for nothing can be witty that is not judicious.
427. A man of wit would be often at a loss, were it not for the company of fools.

---

WOMAN.

428. Women affect coyness, as an addition to their beauty.

429. Women often fancy themselves to be in love when they are not. The amusement of an intrigue, the emotion of mind produced by gallantry, their natural passion for being beloved, and their unwillingness to give a denial; all these make them imagine they are in love, when in fact they are only coquetting.

430. Women are completely cruel only to those they hate.
431. The wit of most women serves rather to fortify their folly than their reason.

432. The virtue of women is often the love of reputation and quiet.

433. There are few virtuous women who are not weary of their profession.

434. Most virtuous women, like concealed treasures, are secure because nobody seeks after them.

435. A woman keeps her first lover long, if she happens not to take a second.

* "Women have an entertaining tattle, and sometimes wit; but for solid reasoning and good sense, I never knew one in my life that had it, or who reasoned and acted consequentially for four-and-twenty hours together."

Ld. Chesterf. Lett. 129.
436. Youth without beauty, with regard to women, is of as little consequence as beauty without youth.

437. The common foible of women who once were handsome, is to forget that they are no longer so *.

438. Most women yield more through weakness than passion; whence it happens that an enterprising rather than an amiable man commonly succeeds best with them †.

* "Every woman who is not absolutely ugly thinks herself handsome.—The suspicion of age no woman, let her be ever so old, ever forgives. —No flattery is either too high or too low for them. They will greedily swallow the highest, and gratefully accept of the lowest; and you may safely flatter any woman, from her understanding to the exquisite taste of her fan."


† "Whenever the slightest wishes arise, the rest will soon follow." Again, "If you are not listened to the first time, try a second, a third, and a fourth. If the place is not already taken,
439. Of all the violent passions, that which least becomes a woman is Love.

440. In their first desires women love the lover, afterwards the passion.

441. That woman is much to be pitied who at once possesses both love and virtue.

"depend upon it, it may be conquered." Lett. 218, 224.

It is difficult to say whether our author or Lord Chesterfield has been hardest upon the sex. His Lordship however (among other douceurs) acknowledges, that "women are the only refiners of the merit of men; that it is true they cannot add weight, but they polish and give a lustre; that they absolutely stamp every man's character in the beau monde, and make it either current, or cry it down, and stop it in payments." Lett. 129—218.
YOUTH.

442. Youth changes its inclinations through heat of blood; old age perseveres in it through habit.

443. Youth is continual intoxication. It is the fever of reason.

444. Young people, at their entrance upon the world, should be either bashful or giddy; a composed self-sufficiency generally turns to impertinence.

445. Timidity is a fault which is dangerous to reprehend in those we would reform *.

* Because temerity, its opposite, is a fault equally dangerous, and it is difficult to draw the line.
446. In every profession every individual affects to appear just what he would willingly be esteemed; so that we may say, the world is composed of nothing but appearances.

447. The rust of business is sometimes polished off in a camp; but never in a court.

448. Civility is a desire to receive civility, and to be accounted well-bred.

449. The only good copies are those which point out the ridicule of bad originals.

450. Decency is the least of all laws; but the most strictly observed.

452. Few cowards know the extent of their fear.

453. We promise according to our hopes, and perform according to our fears.

454. Good sense should be the test of all rule, whether ancient or modern; whatever is incompatible with good sense is false.

455. It is easier to govern than to avoid being governed*.

456. Since great men can not bestow either health of body or peace of

* Agricola governed his family; which many find to be a harder task than to govern a province. Domum suam coercuit, quod plerisque haud minus arduum est quam provinciam regere. Tac.
mind, we certainly pay too dear for all that they can bestow.

457. When our hatred is violent it sinks us even beneath those we hate.

458. Hope, deceitful as it is, carries us agreeably through life *.

459. Hypocrisy is the homage that vice pays to virtue.

460. We find it more difficult to overlook the least infidelity to ourselves than the greatest to others.

461. Innocence finds not near so much protection as guilt.

* It does more; it extends its influence beyond the grave, and helps to reconcile us to the stroke of death.

"Hope travels through, nor quits us when we die."  Pope.
462. Intrepidity is an extraordinary strength of soul, that renders it superior to the trouble, disorder, and emotion which the appearance of danger is apt to excite. By this quality, in the most surprising and dreadful accidents, heroes maintain their tranquillity, and preserve the free use of their reason.

463. Badness of memory every one complains of, but nobody of the want of judgment.

464. The love of justice often means no more than the fear of suffering by injustice.

465. To know things well, we should know them in detail; but this being in a manner infinite, our knowledge must needs be superficial and imperfect.
466. What we call liberality is seldom more than the vanity of giving; we are fonder of the vanity than the generosity of the action*.

467. Magnanimity contemns all to obtain all.

468. Magnanimity is sufficiently defined by its name; yet we may say of magnanimity, that it is the good sense of pride, and the noblest way of acquiring applause.

469. Why have we memory sufficient to retain the minutest circumstances that have happened to us; and yet not enough to remember how often we have related them to the same persons?

* Liberality is not merely the act of giving; it is the noble disposition of the giver.
470. We are often dissatisfied with those who negotiate our affairs, because they often sacrifice their friend to the success of the negotiation: success becomes their own interest, through the honour they expect for bringing to a conclusion what themselves had undertaken.

471. Narrowness of mind is often the cause of obstinacy: we believe no farther than we can see.*

472. Passion often makes a fool of a man of sense: and it sometimes makes a man of sense of a fool.

473. Perseverance merits neither blame nor praise; it is only the duration of our inclinations and sentiments, which we can neither create nor extinguish.

* "Stiff in opinion, always in the wrong."

Dryden.
474. He who is displeased with everybody, is much more unhappy than he with whom nobody is pleased.

475. It is difficult to determine whether a clear, sincere, and honest procedure, be the effect of probity or artifice.

476. We promise according to our hopes, and perform according to our fears.

477. Most men, like plants, have secret properties, which chance alone discovers.

478. That conduct sometimes seems ridiculous, the secret reasons of which may perhaps be wise and solid*.

* That of L. J. Brutus, for example; whose father and eldest brother Tarquin having murdered, he counterfeited himself a fool, in order to escape the same danger. Tarquin, thinking his folly real,
479. A man often imagines he acts, when he is acted upon; and, while his mind aims at one thing, his heart insensibly gravitates towards another.

480. The desire of being either pitied, or admired, is commonly the true reason of our confidence.

481. There are two kinds of curiosity. One arises from interest, which makes us desirous to learn what may be useful to us; the other from pride, despised the man; and, having possessed himself of his estate, kept him as an idiot merely with a view of making sport for his children. At the death of Lucretia, Brutus, happening to be present, threw off the mask: he drew the poignard reeking from her wound, and lifting it up towards heaven; "Be witness, ye Gods," he cried, "that from this moment I proclaim myself the avenger of the chaste Lucretia's death; from this moment I profess myself the enemy of Tarquin."—An amazement seized the hearers!—In the sequel, Tarquin was expelled, and Brutus was proclaimed Deliverer of the people.
which makes us desirous to know what others are ignorant of.

482. Nothing is so contagious as example: never was there any considerable good or ill done that does not produce its like. We imitate good actions through emulation, and bad ones through a malignity in our nature, which shame conceals, and example sets at liberty.

483. Familiarity is a suspension of almost all the laws of civility; liber-

* "Curiosity," says Hobbes, "is a desire to know why and how; such as is in no living creature but man: so that man is distinguished, not only by his reason, but also by this singular passion, from other animals; in whom the appetite of food, and other pleasures of sense, by preponderance, take away the care of knowing causes; which is a lust of the mind, that by a perseverance of delight in the continual and indefatigable generation of knowledge, exceedeth the short vehement of any carnal pleasure." Leivath. p. 26.
tinism has introduced it into society under the notion of Ease.

484. The hatred of favourites is nothing more than the love of favour. Our indignation at not possessing it ourselves is soothed and mitigated by the contempt we express for those who do; and we refuse them our homage, because we are not able to deprive them of that which procures them the homage of every one else.

485. Grace to the body is like good sense to the mind*.

486. An able man will arrange his interests, and conduct each in its pro-

* "They are both the gifts of nature; but they may be cultivated, increased, and brought to perfection. Adorn yourself with all those graces and accomplishments which without solidity are frivolous; but without which, solidity is to a great degree useless."  
_Ld. Chesterf. Lett. 782._
Our greediness often hurts us, in making us prosecute too many things at once; by earnestly desiring the less considerable, we lose the more important.

487. Many people despise riches; yet few know how to bestow them*

488. Ridicule seems to dishonour more than dishonour itself†.

* "Cur eget indignus quisquam te divite; quare
   "Templa ruunt antiqua deûm; cur, improbe,
   "carae
   "Non aliquid patriæ tanto emetiris acervo?"
   Horat.

Then why not better use this proud excess
Of worthless wealth? Why lives in deep distress
A man unworthy to be poor, or why
Our sacred shrines in aged ruins lie?
Why not of such a massy treasure spare
To thy dear country, wretch! a moderate share?
Shalt thou alone no change of fortune know?
Thou future laughter of thy deadliest foe?

† "Ridicule excites contempt and laughter, but
can never be a detector of falsehood or a test of
truth."       Brown against Shaftesb.
489. How can we expect that a friend should keep our secret, whilst we are convincing him that it is more than we can do ourselves?

490. Affected simplicity is refined imposture *

491. Sincerity is an openness of heart which is rarely to be found. It is commonly personated by a refined dissimulation, whose end is to procure confidence.

492. A desire to talk of ourselves, and to set our faults in whatever light we chuse, makes the main of our sincerity.

* "Domitianus simplicitatis ac modestiae imagine studium literarum & amorem carminum simulabat; quo velaret animum, & fratris animationi subduceretur." Tac. A. iv. Domitian, under the mask of simplicity and modesty, affected the love of letters and poetry, the better to conceal his designs, and avoid his brother's jealousy.
493. We commonly slander more through vanity than malice.

494. Sobriety is either the love of health, or an incapacity for debauch.

495. Men would not live long in society were they not the mutual dupes of each other.

496. The accent of a man’s native country is as strongly impressed on his mind as on his tongue.

497. We have more power than will*; we often represent things as im-

* "Multa experiendo consieri, quae segnibus ar-
"dua videntur." Tac. A. xiii. Indolence pers-
suades us that those things are impracticable which we might easily accomplish.

"Nil tam difficile est quin quærendo investigari "posset." Ter.

Nothing so difficult but may be soon accomplished by industry. Colman.
practicable, merely by way of exculpat ing ourselves.

498. No encomiums are thought too great for prudence: yet cannot prudence insure the least event.

499. Quarrels would never be lasting were the fault only on one side.

500. Railery is more insupportable than wrong; because we have a right to resent injuries, but are ridiculous in being angry at a jest.

501. Reconciliation with enemies proceeds from a desire of bettering our condition; to the fatigues of war; or to an apprehension of some untoward event.

502. Repentance is not so much a remorse for what we have done, as an apprehension of consequences.
503. It is less difficult to feign the sensations we have not, than to conceal those we have.

504. Titles, instead of exalting, debase those who act not up to them.

505. Men are oftener treacherous through weakness than design.

506. Subtilty in the extreme is false delicacy; true delicacy is solid subtilty.

507. There are those who, like new songs, are favourites only for a time.

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